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BALANCE, BAND-AID, OR TOURNIQUET: THE ILLUSION
OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS
Every day, thousands of federal officers from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Drug
Enforcement Agency, and a host of other agencies carry out their
duties enforcing the Nation's laws.' Their work is often difficult
and dangerous. Few of these officers may realize, however, that
the armed criminal is not the only danger they face. State and
local officials have faced the possibility of personal liability for
alleged violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. S 19832
for some time. That threat did not extend to federal officers,
however, until 1971, when the Supreme Court created a cause of
action for violations of constitutional rights committed by federal
officers - the "Bivens suit. ' 3 Now, federal officers who vigorously
execute their duties court the threat of civil lawsuits from angry
citizens who believe that their rights have been infringed.
The Court did not create the Bivens suit in a vacuum, however.
Our legal system has long recognized a zone of "qualified immunity"
for public officials acting within the scope of their duties.4 The two
judicially created doctrines are thus at odds with each other: one
exposes officials to lawsuits; the other provides shelter from such
suits. Although the Bivens suit reflects the evolution of this coun-
try's appreciation of constitutional rights, the development of qual-
ified immunity has not maintained the balance. Qualified immunity
exists now as a judicial band-aid solution to a complex problem,
subject to practical, procedural, and jurisprudential weaknesses. 5
1. The federal government employs over 108,000 full- and part-time law enforcement
officers. U.S. DEP'T OF CO MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1989 176
table 301 (109th ed. 1989).
2. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
3. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
4. See infra note 38.
5. See Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism
and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 35-36 (1989). "[Qualified
immunity's] development in the Supreme Court has been marked by ad hoc decisionmaking,
conflicting rationales, and a high degree of doctrinal manipulation:' Id. at 36.
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The doctrine is an ephemeral shield against well-pleaded complaints
and an indiscriminate sword against many well-founded claims.
The Court refined the qualified immunity doctrine most recently
in Anderson v. Creighton,6 declaring that this doctrine protects all
but the "plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law."'7 Yet, an officer who relies upon the protection of qualified
immunity would be like the fairytale emperor who paraded before
his subjects in a suit made of cloth, which he was told would be
invisible to those "unfit for office or unforgivably stupid. '8 Regard-
less of professionalism and good intentions, any officer may in fact
be exposed to the burdens and stress of defending a lawsuit.9
Plaintiffs with well-founded complaints of constitutional *violations
also are sacrificed to the doctrine of qualified immunity. Even
though a citizen may have suffered a constitutional injury, the
qualified immunity doctrine often serves as an indiscriminate tour-
niquet, cutting off any hope of moral vindication, as well as dam-
ages, for victims who have not been criminally charged.10
Further, the qualified immunity doctrine prevents the full de-
velopment of constitutional law. Because courts may grant immu-
nity when the law "is not clearly established,"" the law will never
6. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
7. Id. at 638 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
8. H.C. ANDERSEN, The Emperor's New Clothes, in A TREASURY OF HANS CHRISTIAN
ANDERSEN 79, 79 (E. Haugaard trans. 1974).
9. An officer has little refuge against the annoyance of a litigious plaintiff. For example,
in James v. United States, 709 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1989), a Nigerian resident alien brought
suit pro se against the United States and a District of Columbia policeman, alleging common
law and constitutional torts. Id. at 258. The plaintiff complained that in November 1986,
the officer had, inter alia, used excessive force in arresting him for driving without a
license. Id. at 258-59. After limited discovery, the district court dismissed the case on a
variety of grounds. Id- at 261.
Shortly after the dismissal, the plaintiff brought another pro se suit alleging common
law and constitutional torts, this time against the United States Customs Service and an
unknown United States Customs officer. James v. United States Customs Serv., No. 89-733
(D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). James alleged that the officers
violated his rights in the course of searching him upon his arrival at Baltimore-Washington
International Airport on a flight from Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Id. at *1. The district
court dismissed that case for failure to state a claim, but the litigation still subjected the
defendants to the stress and expense of limited discovery. Id- at *3.
10. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. 635, In Anderson, officials subjected the plaintiffs to a
warrantless, nighttime search, during which an official punched one of the plaintiffs in the
mouth. Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D. Minn. 1989). The court never
permitted the parties to fully develop or challenge the questionable "exigent circumstances."
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 657-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Had Creighton, the plaintiff, been
charged with a crime, a court would have had an opportunity to determine whether the
officials' actions that night were justified as a matter of law, and, if not, a court would
have excluded at trial any evidence obtained by the illegal search.
11. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
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become clearly established except in criminal trials in which the
Supreme Court hears suppression appeals.12
In the wake of the Court's decision in WestfaU v. Erwin,5 which
restricted immunity for common law torts, Congress created pro-
tection for all federal officials against suit for common law torts
by making the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)4 the exclusive
remedy for such actions. Yet, Congress specifically withheld that
protection from federal officials charged with constitutional torts. 5
This Note argues that Congress should amend the FTCA to
include constitutional torts. First, the Note reviews the origins of
the constitutional tort and the development of the qualified im-
munity doctrine. Next, the Note examines the shortfalls of the
qualified immunity doctrine .and discusses how the doctrine has
failed government officials, rightful plaintiffs, and the judicial sys-
tem that created it. The Note then outlines how Congress has
attempted to insulate federal officers from personal liability through
the FTCA-protection that is often illusory because of the large
loophole resulting from Congress' failure to include constitutional
torts within the coverage of the FTCA. The Note concludes that
Congress should amend the FTCA to include constitutional torts
as well as common law torts.
By making the FTCA the exclusive remedy for all alleged torts
committed by government employees acting within the scope of
their employment, Congress will provide far more substantial cov-
erage to federal officers than the illusory protections of the quali-
fied immunity doctrine. At-the same time, Congress will empower
citizens to seek just vindication of their rights and will enable the
courts to decide sincere constitutional questions and thus guide
future law enforcement actions. 6
.12. In the context of the current "war on drugs," the qualified immunity doctrine poses
a particularly grave danger to constitutional rights. Civil libertarians have complained
recently that the greatest victim of the drug war may be the constitutional rights of
citizens. See Lacayo, A Threat to Freedom?, TM, Sept. 18, 1989, at 28. Even legal experts
have noted an emerging "drug exception" to the Constitution. Id.
13. 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1988).
15. Id. § 2679(b)(2).
16. The qualified immunity doctrine developed by the Court is unified for both 42 U.S.C.
1983 civil rights actions (involving state and local officials) and Bivens suits (involving
federal officials). It would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law
between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under
the Constitution against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). The
problems experienced with the doctrine in the federal context are therefore the same ones
experienced at the local level, and the reasoning that supports the federal government's
1991]
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HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
The Origin of the Constitutional Tort: Section 1983
In 1871, the forty-second Congress first recognized the consti-
tutional tort as a cause of action. Congress enacted a "Civil Action
for Deprivation of Rights," which provided that "any person who,
under color of any law . . . of any State," deprived another of the
rights secured by the Constitution or other law would be liable in
an action at law or equity.17 Congress first drafted the law not to
waiver of sovereign immunity would therefore support such a waiver by state and local
governments as well, in the abstract.
Amenability of a municipality to suit carries important consequences. In
appropriate cases, it focuses the litigation on the party directly responsible
for the constitutional violation and thereby may provide a surer means of
deterrence. Municipal liability also provides greater assurance that compen-
sation in fact will be accomplished by placing the risk of loss on the population
at large. This liability may also bring political pressures on the governing unit
to change its unconstitutional policies or practices.
Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 30-31.
On a more concrete level, however, S 1983 actions involve a number of additional complex
federalism and constitutional issues beyond the scope of this Note. Such issues include
sovereign immunity, application of the eleventh amendment, and the definition of a "person"
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v.
New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), overruled in part, Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663
(1978) (overruling the proposition that local governments are wholly immune from S 1983
suits); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Although these issues may inhibit the remedying
of qualified immunity in S 1983 situations, the federal government is free of such concerns
and has the power to take broad, effective action. Congress should take the first step in
this area by discarding the judicial band-aid of qualified immunity.
17. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, S 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1983
(1988)). The "Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights" reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Id. Post-Civil War unrest in the southern states originally motivated Congress to enact this
law:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life
and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the
revenue dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some
localities is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is
beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the
Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is
736
1991] THE ILLUSION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
create a new type of relief for injured parties, but to provide a
federal forum for constitutional complaints when the state forum
was inadequate.18 Section 1983 has become a fertile source of
litigation, spawning thousands of cases alleging deprivation of
rights. 9
By its terms, section 1983 applies only to those officials acting
under state law; courts have held that federal officials acting under
federal law are beyond the reach of section 1983.2 Although
Congress enacted a number of laws providing criminal sanctions
or civil remedies for specific types of official misconduct,2' it failed
to provide a federal version of section 1983 to cover complaints of
constitutional violations by federal officials.
The Federal Cause of Action: The Bivens Suit
In 1971, the Supreme Court found a compelling case in which to
create a cause of action for constitutional torts committed by
federal officials. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,22 the plaintiff alleged that agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, acting without a warrant, entered his apart-
sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recom-
mend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure
life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United
States......
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172-73 (quoting President Grant's Message to Congress (Mar. 23, 1871),
reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871)).
18. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-80. The Court noted that the law had three aims: "First,
it might, of course, override certain kinds of state laws .... Second, it provided a remedy
where state law was inadequate .... The third aim was to provide a federal remedy where
the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice." Id. at 173-74.
19. A search via computerized legal research on January 29, 1990, revealed that courts
had issued opinions in 15,556 S 1983 cases since 1945. Section 1983 actions have included
allegations of police misconduct, see Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246 (W.D.N.C.
1986), affld, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); claims
of denial of due process made by government employees, see Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d
79 (2d Cir. 1988); prisoners, see Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1988); mental
hospital patients, see Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989); and high school
students, see Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244 (WD. Ark. 1972), rev'd, 485 F.2d 186
(8th Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. Wood v. Stricdand, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
20. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F.Supp. 12 (ED.N.Y. 1967), afiTd, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
21. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 2.24 (1988) (making it a crime to obtain a warrant maliciously);
id. § 2235 (providing criminal sanctions for searching an occupied building without a warrant
under certain circumstances); 28 U.S.C. 5 1346(b) (the FTCA) (providing that the government
is liable for the negligent or wrongful acts of employees who were acting within the scope
of their employment under circumstances in which a private person would be liable to the
victim); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (the Wiretapping Act) (providing sanctions for unauthorized police
wiretapping).
22. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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ment and arrested him for alleged narcotics violations.p The agents
manacled him in front of his wife and children and threatened to
arrest the whole family before searching the apartment from "stem
to stern." The agents took Bivens to the federal courthouse in
Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and strip-searched,
but the Bureau later dropped the charges against him.P
Bivens brought suit against the agents in the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, claiming damages as a result of
an unconstitutional search and seizure.2 The court was unsym-
pathetic to Bivens' desire for federal court adjudication, holding
that section 1983 clearly did not apply to federal officials.Y The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,28
noting that the plaintiff should have brought his claim in a state
court: "'In the scheme of the Constitution [the state courts] . . .
are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many
cases they may be the ultimate ones.' "2
In a landmark decision authored by Justice Brennan, the Su-
preme Court reversed, creating a federal cause of action for con-
stitutional violations committed by federal officials2 ° The Court
based its decision upon both a federal supremacy theory and a
civil rights vindication theory, noting that when plaintiffs brought
23. Id. at 389.
24. Id.
25. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718,
719 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
26. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12
(E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'id 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens sought
federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and 28 U.S.C. SS 1331(a), 1343(3), and 1343(4).
27. Bivens, 276 F. Supp. at 13-14. The court quoted with approval Judge Learned Hand's
opinion in Gregoire v. Biddle- "Section 43 [the precursor of section 1983] is so plainly limited
to acts done under color of some state or territorial law or ordinance that no discussion
can make it clearer than appears from its reading." Id. at 14 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cr. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)). The court went on to hold
that the complaint failed to state any cause of action under federal law; therefore, no
jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. S 1331. Id. at 14-15. The court quoted extensively from
Bell v. Hood to support its holding-
Whenever a federal officer or agent exceeds his authority, in so doing he no
longer represents the Government and hence loses the protection of sovereign
immunity from suit .. . Plaintiffs are unable to point to any constitutional
provision or federal statute giving one who has suffered an unreasonable
search and seizure or false imprisonment by federal officers any federal right
or cause of action to recover damages from those officers as individuals.
Id. at 15 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Cal. 1949)).
28. Bivens, 409 F.2d 718.
29. Id. at 721 (quoting H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 339 (1st ed. 1953)).
30. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388.
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suits against federal officials in state courts, the Department of
Justice removed all such suits to federal courts as a matter of
policy.31 As a result, federal courts evaluated the conduct of federal
officials, arguably in the pursuit of their official duties, according
to state law. The Court refused to accept that situation.2
Brennan then explored the unsuitability of applying state tort
remedies to allegations of constitutional violations by federal offi-
cials. He noted that the relationship between a citizen and an
official is not amenable to treatment under common law tort
principles because an agent acting under color of federal authority
possesses a greater capacity for harm than does a private individ-
ual.m Brennan emphasized that "power, once granted, does not
disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used." He went
on to point out that a state remedy against private citizens would
not deal with the same concerns as the Constitution: "[0]ur cases
make clear [that] the Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation
upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether the State
in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or
penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citizen. '3 5
Having based its decision upon these practical foundations, the
Court concluded by articulating its guiding philosophy. Quoting
from Marbury v. Madison, it noted that "'[tihe very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.' "37
DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Origins of the Qualified Immunity Rationale: Undampened Ardor
The Supreme Court created the Bivens cause of action in a
system that had a long tradition of recognizing areas of absolute
and qualified immunity for public officials,s at a time when that
tradition was entering an era of rich development.
31. Id. at 391.
32. Id. at 392-95.
33. Id. at 394-95.
34. Id at 392.
35. Id
36. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
37. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137).
38. The concept of granting immunity to public officials originated in England at least
as early as 1608. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 579-80 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
The doctrine made its way to this country, receiving recognition in the United States
Constitution with respect to any speech, debate, vote, report, or other legislative activity
1991] 739
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Then-Judge Learned Hand set out the underlying rationale
behind the immunity doctrine in Gregoire v. Biddle9:
[I]f it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to
the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The jus-
tification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether
the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and
that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty,
to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its
outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,
or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.40
The Court cited Hand's opinion in Gregoire with approval when
it considered the question of immunity for lesser executive branch
officials in Barr v. Matteo.41 In Barr, the plaintiffs alleged that
the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization issued a
defamatory press release announcing his intention to suspend the
plaintiffs because of their involvement in a plan to use agency
funds for settlement of terminal leave.4 2 Holding that executive
officers performing official acts are absolutely immune from civil
defamation suits, 43 the Court reasoned that "[ilt has been thought
important that officials of government should be free to exercise
their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect
of acts done in the course of those duties."' 44 The decision focused
upon whether the official's actions were within the scope of his
of members of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 6. The judiciary gradually extended the law
of privilege to judges and other public officials involved in judicial proceedings. See Barr,
360 U.S. at 569; see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (holding that judges
are not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.
1926) (holding that judges, district and prosecuting attorneys, and special assistants to the
Attorney General of the United States are immune from civil suits for their official actions),
afid, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam).
The genesis of immunity for executive branch officials in this country occurred in Spalding
v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), in which the plaintiff brought a defamation suit against the
Postmaster General, alleging that the defendant, acting maliciously, had circulated a letter
about the plaintiff. Id. at 484-85. The Court held that "the head of an Executive Department,
keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in
a civil suit for damages." Id. at 498-99.
39. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
40. Id. at 581.
41. 360 U.S. at 571-72.
42. Id. at 565-68.
43. Id. at 574.
44. Id. at 571.
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duty or authority,45 approving Hand's assertion that "[tihe deci-
sions have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation upon the
immunity that the official's act must have been within the scope
of his powers. ' 46 The Court concluded that "[t]he fact that the
action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's
line of duty is enough to render the privilege applicable." 47
Extension and Evolution of Good Faith: From Subjective to
Objective
The Court expanded and developed the qualified immunity
doctrine in subsequent decisions. It extended the protection to
police officers8 and created a "good faith" standard for immu-
nity.49 This good faith standard contained both objective and
subjective elements.50 Objectively, the Court required that offi-
cials be aware of "clearly established constitutional rights."51
Subjectively, the Court called on trial judges to determine whether
45. Id. at 574-75.
46. Id. at 572 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
47. Id. at 575.
48. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In Pierson, the plaintiffs were members of a
group of white and African-American ministers who were arrested when they attempted
to use a segregated interstate bus terminal waiting room in Jackson, Mississippi. Id. at
548-49. The state subsequently charged the plaintiffs with breaching the peace under a
state statute which the Court later declared unconstitutional. Id. at 548-50 & n.4 (citing
Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965)). The Court held that the police officers could
assert the defense of good faith and probable cause and remanded the case for a new trial.
Id. at 557-58.
49. Id. at 557.
50. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In Wood, a school board suspended three
high school girls for a period of three months for their part in "spiking" punch with malt
liquor at a school event. Id. at 311-12. The Court determined the good faith of a school
board member by reference to whether the member "knew, or reasonably should have
known[,] that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury:' Id. at 322.
51. Id. The Court noted that if a school board member acted in apparent disregard of
the student's "clearly established constitutional rights," then "his action cannot reasonably
be characterized as being in good faith:' Id.
In his dissent in Wood, Justice Powell complained that the standard of requiring officials
to know "what is characterized as 'settled, indisputable law,' leaves little substance to the
doctrine of qualified immunity" Id. at 329 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell continued:
The Court's decision appears to rest on an unwarranted assumption as to what
lay school officials know or can know about the law and constitutional rights.
These officials will now act at the peril of some judge or jury subsequently
finding that a good-faith belief as to the applicable law was mistaken and
hence actionable.
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the defendant acted with "malicious intent" to deprive the plain-
tiff of constitutional rights.5 2 During the same period, the Court
held that the extent of an official's qualified immunity depends
upon "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office
and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the
time of the action on which liability is sought to be based."'
The subjective questions of "good faith" and "malicious intent"
did not survive for long. In 1982, the Court substantially revised
the qualified immunity doctrine in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,4 holding
that henceforth the test would be purely objective.15 Justice
Powell began the qualified immunity analysis by noting that in
cases of official misconduct, "an action for damages may offer
the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guar-
antees."' He continued, however, by noting that "claims fre-
quently run against the innocent as well as the guilty; at a cost
not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole '." 57
52. Id at 322.
53. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). According to the Court, qualified immunity
was necessary to encourage public officials to execute their offices with "decisiveness" and
judgment. Id at 240. The Court noted that qualified immunity rested,
in its genesis, on two mutually dependent rationales: (1) the injustice, partic-
ularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is
required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the
danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute
his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.
Id. at 239-40.
The plaintiffs-personal representatives of three of the four students killed by National
Guard troops-had brought suit against the Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General of the
Ohio National Guard, various other Guard officers and enlisted members, and the President
of Kent State University for their part in the "Kent State Massacre" of May 1970. Id. at
234. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
the eleventh amendment. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed, noting that, in the alternative, executive immunity would have barred the suit.
Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court held that the eleventh
amendment did not bar the plaintiffs' claims under § 1983 and remanded the case for
factual findings on the immunity issue. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 238, 250.
54. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Fitzgerald was an infamous "whistleblower" in the Department
of Defense. in the late 1960's. After his job was eliminated by a reorganization, he sued,
alleging a conspiracy to discharge him in retribution for his testimony to Congress on Air
Force procurement cost overruns. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733-39 (1982).
55. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-19.
56. Id at 814. The Court referred to Bivens, in which Justice Harlan pointed out that
for one whose rights had been violated, injunctive relief would rarely be available, sovereign
immunity would preclude a remedy against the government, and the exclusionary rule
would not apply if the victim was innocent of a crime. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971).
57. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
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The Court found the subjective test incompatible with the
principal goal of official immunity, namely that "insubstantial
claims should not proceed to trial." In addition to the great
financial and social costs of suits against officials,59 the subjective
test involved excessive inquiry into officials' intent.60 Powell
concluded that the most effective way to preclude undue litigation
against public officials exercising discretionary functions would
be to provide a strictly objective standard for determining qual-
ified immunity:
[B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to subject gov-
ernment officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens
of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that govern-
ment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.61
The Court's goal in providing the "objective reasonableness"
standard was to "avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary
judgment."62 Therefore, a judge could determine the "threshold
immunity question"6-whether a clearly established legal rule
existed at the time of the alleged violation -before trial. In areas
in which a clearly established legal rule did not exist, "the public
interest may be better served by action taken 'with independence
and without fear of consequences.' "64
Changing the Question from Fact to Law
In Mitchell v. Forsyth,5 the Court set out the elements of the
qualified immunity defense. The Court stressed that the qualified
immunity entitlement "is an immunity from suit rather than a
58. Id. at 815-16.
59. These costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from
pressing public issues, the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office, and
the cooling of public officials' ardor in the discharge of their offices. Id. at 814.
60. Id. at 816-17.
61. Id. at 817-18.
62. Id. at 818.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 819 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
65. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). The plaintiff in Mitchell sued the Attorney General of the United
States for alleged violations of the plaintiffs fourth amendment rights and of title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Id. at 515.
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mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. 6 6
The issues involved in the qualified immunity decision under
Harlow were thus "conceptually distinct" from the merits of the
case.67 The qualified immunity question was to be strictly a
question of law: "whether the legal norms allegedly violated by
the defendant were clearly established at the time of the chal-
lenged actions or .. .whether the law clearly proscribed the
actions the defendant claims he took.t'6 8
In 1986, the Court extended the Harlow standard of objective
reasonableness, with its potential for use at summary judgment,
to police officers in Malley v. Briggs.6 9 Under the objective rea-
sonableness test, judges should deny claims for immunity only if
"it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have
concluded" that the action was lawful; however, "if officers of
reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity
should be recognized. ' '70 The Court concluded that such a test for
qualified immunity would protect "all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law. '71
66. Id. at 526.
67. Id. at 527-28.
68. Id. at 528.
69. 475 U.S. 335 (1986). Malley was a Rhode Island state trooper who obtained arrest
warrants for the Briggses, based upon intercepted telephone conversations that led him to
believe they were in possession of marijuana. Id. at 337-38. When the grand jury did not
return an indictment, the Briggses sued, alleging violations of their fourth and fourteenth
amendment rights. Id. at 338.
Although the district court granted a directed verdict for Malley on the premise that
the judge's act in granting the warrant had broken the causal link between Malley's act
and the Briggs' arrest, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,
holding that the officer was not entitled to immunity unless he had an objectively reasonable
basis for believing that the facts alleged in his affidavit were sufficient to form probable
cause. Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1984), aft'd, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Malley's argument for absolute immunity. Malley,
475 U.S. at 339. Ironically, the Court restricted the police officer's immunity by applying
the same test of objective reasonableness that it used to create a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Malley, 475 U.S. at 344.
Leon, like Malley, involved objective reasonableness in obtaining a search warrant. See Leon,
468 U.S. at 918-25. The Court stated in Ma//ey that "it would be incongruous to test police
behavior by the 'objective reasonableness' standard in a suppression hearing while ex-
empting police conduct in applying for an arrest or search warrant from any scrutiny
whatsoever in a S 1983 damages action." Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 (citation omitted). The
Court justified the symmetry by noting that the exclusionary rule, though necessary, carried
with it great social costs, whereas a S 1983 action imposed the costs directly upon the
officer responsible for the unreasonable request "without the side effect of hampering a
criminal prosecution." Id.
70. Maley, 475 U.S. at 341.
71. Id.
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The Justices believed that the Malley-Harlow standard of qual-
ified immunity for police officers struck a fair balance. The
standard would provide a cause of action against officers who
acted unreasonably and would stimulate officers to "exercis[e]
reasonable professional judgment,' 7 2 while at the same time per-
mitting officers to defeat frivolous claims through summary judg-
ment before trial.73 Further, the Court did not believe that a
qualified immunity standard would seriously impede law enforce-
ment.74
Dangerous Definition: The Objective Reasonableness Standard
Under Anderson v. Creighton
What the Court in Malley failed to provide, however, was any
guidance for determining what "reasonably competent" police
officers would know or agree upon 75 Such a determination ap-
pears to be a question of fact, which requires a trial and therefore
defeats the goal of dismissing unwarranted claims at summary
judgment. Malley's fatal flaw of requiring judicial definition of
the "reasonable officer" continued to haunt the Court's decisions
on qualified immunity.
In a purported clarification of the Harlow objective reasona-
bleness standard, the Court in fact created a significantly differ-
ent standard of situational objectivity for the defense of qualified
immunity in Anderson v. Creighton.6 Rendering the opinion of
72. Id at 346.
73. Id at 341.
Before Malley, the Supreme Court had not afforded law enforcement officers
an immunity that would be available at summary judgment. It had recognized
the defenses of probable cause and reasonable good faith, but defendant officers
had to stand trial on those issues .... Harlow by its own terms did not affect
the defenses of police officers, only those of aides of the President and high
government officials. Thus, although Harlow eliminated the issue of subjective
good faith in suits against high government officials, it did not necessarily do
so in suits against police officers, in which very different policy concerns might
apply.
The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARv. L. REV. 119, 228 n.61 (1987)
(citation omitted) [hereinafter The Supreme Court].
74. The Court noted in Ma//ey:
In the case of the officer applying for a warrant, it is our judgment that the
judicial process will on the whole benefit from a rule of qualified rather than
absolute immunity. We do not believe that the Harlow standard, which gives
ample room for mistaken judgments, will frequently deter an officer from
submitting an affidavit when probable cause to make an arrest is present.
Malley, 475 U.S. at 343.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 157-85.
76. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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the Court, Justice Scalia sought to define "the level of generality
at which the relevant 'legal rule' "-which the Court in Harlow
said must be "clearly established" 77 - "is to be identified. '78 The
Court held that "the right the official is alleged to have violated
must have been 'clearly established' in a more particularized, and
hence more relevant, sense."79 The decision continued beyond
that legal standard to add the "fact-specific"80 question of whether
"[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reason-
able official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right."81
The test resulting from Anderson requires a two-part analysis.
First, the judge must make a factual determination of the cir-
cumstances in which the official acted.8 Second, the judge must
make a legal determination of whether the rights that the officer
allegedly violated were so clearly established for that particular
situation that an objectively reasonable officer would have known
that the alleged actions were unlawful.83
In Anderson, the plaintiffs brought a Bivens civil rights suit
against a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent who con-
ducted a warrantless search of their house while looking for a
robbery suspect. 4 Suspecting that the robber was Mrs. Creigh-
ton's brother, a convicted felon, the defendant FBI agent and
other officers entered the Creightons' home without their con-
sent, while uniformed and plainclothes officers surrounded the
house.85 In response to Creighton's request for a warrant, a police
sergeant stated, "We don't have a search warrant. I don't need
a search warrant. You watch too much T.V.' 88 During the exten-
sive search of the house and property, an officer punched Robert
Creighton in the mouth.87
77. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
78. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
79. Id. at 640.
80. Id at 641.
81. Id. at 640.
82. Id. at 646 n.6.
83. Id. at 640.
84. Id. at 637.
85. See Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654, 656-57 (D. Minn. 1989) (on remand from
the Supreme Court), affd, 922 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1990). The district court memorandum
opinion set out the facts with particularity and found that the defendant was entitled to
qualified immunity. Id. at 661. Both parties supplied affidavits that formed the factual basis
of the court's opinion; the court viewed disputed facts in the plaintiffs' favor. Id. at 655-56.
86. Id. at 657.
87. Id.
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The Court noted that "it is inevitable that law enforcement
officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude
that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in
such cases those officials-like other officials who act in ways
they reasonably believe to be lawful-should not be held person-
ally liable."' Scalia was unimpressed with the Creightons' argu-
ment that qualified immunity should not apply to officials alleged
to have violated the fourth amendment: "It is not possible . . .
to say that one 'reasonably' acted unreasonably. '89 In rebutting
the argument, Scalia distinguished the fourth amendment stan-
dard of reasonableness from the Harlow-Anderson standard of
objective reasonableness." He then revealed the policy underly-
ing the decision: "Law enforcement officers whose judgments in
making these difficult determinations are objectively legally rea-
sonable should no more be held personally liable in damages than
should officials making analogous determinations in other areas
of law." 91
Although Scalia and the Court may have intended to broaden
the protection available to government officials under the quali-
fied immunity defense,9 2 the decision ultimately may have had
the opposite effect by undercutting Harlow's goal of allowing
innocent officials to defeat claims at summary judgment. Scalia
asserted that the analysis in Anderson "does not reintroduce into
qualified immunity analysis the inquiry into officials' subjective
intent that Harlow sought to minimize."93 He went on to note,
however, that "[tihe relevant question in this case, for example,
is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable
officer could have believed Anderson's warrantless search to be
lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the
searching officers possessed."94 The Court acknowledged that
88. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
89. Id. at 643.
90. Id. Scalia noted as a "short answer" that "we have previously extended qualified
immunity to officials who were alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment:' Id. He
went on to dismiss the argument as one of semantics. Id.; see infra text accompanying note
200.
91. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644.
92. For an illustration of this interpretation, see id. at 641:
The principles of qualified immunity that we reaffirm today require that
Anderson be permitted to argue that he is entitled to summary judgment on
the ground that, in light of the clearly established principles governing war-
rantless searches, he could, as a matter of law, reasonably have believed that
the search of the Creightons' home was lawful.
93. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-20 (1982)).
94. Id.
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balancing the Harlow goal of early case resolution with the
necessary factfinding under Anderson could be "complicated." 95
The Court's solution was an admonition to resolve qualified
immunity questions at the earliest possible stage of litigation.96
The Band-Aid Solution: A Summary of Current Qualified
Immunity Doctrine
A clear picture has emerged from the Court's qualified im-
munity decisions with regard to the justifications for and pur-
poses of the doctrine. In general, the doctrine seeks to balance
the legitimate concerns of persons whose rights federal officials
allegedly violated with the need to insulate government officials
from harassment through frivolous lawsuits.97 The Court has
,noted that "the Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon
the exercise of federal power."9 8 It has further recognized that
an action for damages may well be essential for the protection
of constitutional guarantees.9 9 In addition, the Court in Ha'low
noted the public interest in the "deterrence of unlawful conduct
and in compensation of victims."'0
Despite its concern with protecting the constitutional rights of
citizens, the Court also has been well aware of the
injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting
to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations
of his position, to exercise discretion; [and] the danger that the
threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute
his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by
the public good. 101
Further, the Court pointed out in Harlow that "claims frequently
run against the innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only
to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole."'0 2 These
95. Id. at 646 n.6.
96. Id
97. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295-96 (1988).
98. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392 (1971).
99. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, wherever he receives an injury.")).
100. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
101. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
102. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
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costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official
energy from pressing public issues, the deterrence of able citizens
from acceptance of public office, and the cooling of ardor in the
discharge of official duties.10 3
The Court thus has engaged in a judicial balancing act, pro-
viding some cause of action against wrongdoing officials but
limiting relief to those cases alleging misconduct by officials who
either are "plainly incompetent or ... knowingly violate the
law."'1 4 To be effective, the Court has noted, the qualified im-
munity defense should be available early in the litigation process
to "protect public officials from the 'broad-ranging discovery' that
can be 'peculiarly disruptive of effective government.' "105 In the
context of civil litigation against individual officials, the goals of
protecting citizens from abuses of power while simultaneously
insulating government officials from liability are simply not com-
patible. In its attempt to provide an adjustable tourniquet to
regulate the expenses of lawsuits against public officials, the
Court has been able to apply only an ill-fitting band-aid.
SHORTFALLS OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Practical Problems
Anderson v. Creighton106 remains the Supreme Court's definitive
pronouncement on qualified immunity, yet the doctrine is rife
with practical, procedural, and jurisprudential infirmities. On a
practical level, the qualified immunity doctrine fails to satisfy
the concerns of either plaintiffs or defendants and falls far short
of achieving the purposes that the Court set out for it. Although
it may be true that "[lt is a very hard undertaking to seek to
please everybody,"'0 7 the qualified immunity doctrine is a failure
even by its own standards.
The ultimate resolution of Anderson °8 illustrates the problems
with the current doctrine. The Supreme Court provided the lower
103. Id.
104. MaUey v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
105. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817
(footnote omitted)).
106. 483 U.S. 635.
107. Publillus Syrus, Maxim 675, quoted in J. BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
112 (15th ed. 1980).
108. Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654 (D. Minn. 1989), affid, 922 F.2d 443 (8th
Cir. 1990).
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court with explicit directions on how to proceed on remand.1 9 In
accordance with these directions, the district court first estab-
lished the facts involved in the incident by referring to affidavits
provided by, witnesses and both parties, to exhibits attached to
the affidavits, and to Anderson's deposition. Viewing disputed
material facts in the plaintiffs' favor,10 the court then analyzed
whether any reasonable officer in Anderson's situation could have
believed that the actions he took that night were reasonable."'
Determining that a reasonable officer could so conclude, the court
granted Anderson's motion for summary judgment based upon
his qualified immunity defense. 1 2 When the district court issued
its final order, though, neither Creighton, Anderson, nor the
judicial system had benefitted from the Supreme Court's qualified
immunity doctrine.
The Plaintiffs' Perspective: Rights Denied
From the plaintiffs' perspective, the application of the doctrine
failed to acknowledge that the Creightons had two significant
concerns implicit in their lawsuit. Although they indeed sought
monetary damages for the alleged violation of their rights, they
also sought to establish and vindicate those rights. In what may
be a sad commentary on the state of American social develop-
ment, the qualified immunity doctrine focuses exclusively on the
question of damages."3
In addition to denying the Creightons' monetary damages, the
judge denied them the opportunity to establish in court that the
officers' actions violated their right to "be secure in [their] per-
109. [01n remand, it should first be determined whether the actions the Creightons
allege Anderson to have taken are actions that a reasonable officer could have
believed lawful. If they are, then Anderson is entitled to dismissal prior to
discovery. If they are not, and if the actions Anderson claims he took are
different from those the Creightons allege (and are actions that a reasonable
officer could have believed lawful), then discovery may be necessary before
Anderson's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can
be resolved.
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646-47 n.6 (citation omitted).
110. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. at 655-56.
111. Id. at 658-60.
112. Id at 661.
113. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) ("In situations of abuse of office,
an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional
guarantees."); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages
or nothing.").
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sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures."" 4 The district court misstated the result of the
case when it said, "Based upon those facts and accepting plain-
tiffs' version of the disputed facts as true, defendant's search of
the Creighton house was objectively reasonable."115 The court
could not know that the search was objectively reasonable be-
cause it did not inquire into whether any "exigent circumstances"
did, in fact, justify the warrantless search that Anderson con-
ducted. 16 The court asked only whether "[a]n officer knowing
what Anderson did could reasonably have concluded that there
was probable cause that [the suspect] was at the Creighton home
on November 11, 1983 and that exigent circumstances existed to
search the home that night."" 7 As a result, the court misapplied
the determination of what a reasonable officer could have believed
to be exigent circumstances as establishing the fourth amendment
standard of an objectively reasonable search in fact."8 The ulti-
mate question Anderson poses-whether the circumstances in-
volved actually did constitute exigent circumstances -therefore
remains unanswered."9
The Defendant's Perspective: Scant Protection
Even though Anderson ultimately won summary judgment in
the case against him, the qualified immunity doctrine failed him.
In addition to the three years during which the constitutional
questions on qualified immunity percolated to the Supreme Court,
the Creightons' civil rights suit tied up Anderson for two years
following the Court's remand. 20 During that time, Anderson
underwent pretrial maneuvering on the scope of discovery, and
the plaintiffs ultimately deposed him. The full impact on any
defendant in Anderson's shoes of simply being involved in a suit
114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
115. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. at 661.
116. See id at 658-60.
117. Id. at 661.
118. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-99 (1989); see also id. at 399 n.12 (noting
the qualified immunity standard of "objective good faith" as distinguished from the fourth
amendment standard explained in the text of the decision).
119. For a discussion concerning the inhibition of constitutional development, see infra
text accompanying notes 214-24.
120. The Supreme Court remanded the case on June 25, 1987. Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635 (1987). The district court rendered its decision on July 14, 1989. Creighton v.
Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654 (D. Minn. 1989). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed on December 17, 1990. Creighton v. Anderson, 922 F.2d 443 (8th
Cir. 1990).
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can be "devastating.' 121 Such involvement may hamper defend-
ants' efforts to obtain loans, keep defendants from disposing of
certain real property, subject defendants to great personal and
professional stress, and force defendants to lose countless hours
defending the suit.122
After the suit was over, Anderson and his fellow officers were
no better off for having gone through the process. The summary
judgment resolution prevented a clear ruling as to whether the
officers' actions were in fact lawful.'2 The suit left law enforce-
ment officers to wonder whether similar actions in the future
will be good police work or instead will expose them to the same
legal jeopardy that Anderson faced.'A
The System's Perspective: Much Cost at Little Benefit
The qualified immunity doctrine has failed even the judicial
system that created it. At the birth of our Nation, James Madison
declared that "[j]ustice is the end of government. It is the end
of civil society.' ' 25 The doctrine of qualified immunity can be
directly counterproductive to that moral ambition. In his dissent
to the grant of immunity in Barr v. Matteo,'26 Justice Brennan
asserted that "the way to minimizing the burdens of litigation
does not generally lie through the abolition of a right of redress
121. Legislation to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings on H.R. 4358, H.R. 3872,
and H.R. 3083 Before the Subcom m. on Admin. Law and Gov't Relations of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Robert
L. Willmore, Deputy Assist. Att'y Gen., Civil Div., Dep't of Justice).
122. Id.
123. For a discussion of the impact of qualified immunity on the development of consti-
tutional law, see infra text accompanying notes 214-24.
124. Charles H. Whitebread, a law professor and instructor at the FBI National Academy,
noted the problem of leaving unclear rules to guide police officers:
For over twelve years, I have taught at the F.B.I. National Academy in
Quantico, Virginia. I teach 300 state and local police officers each quarter.
From that experience, I feel quite fervently the imperative of rule-oriented
decision-making in police related cases. It is a major jurisprudential error for
any appellate court to leave the police uncertain as to what they may lawfully
do, until a series of subsequent court decisions have supplied the nice factual
distinctions necessary to establish the line between permissible and impermis-
sible conduct. Without clear rules, the police will have no reliable idea of what
they may do, many mistakes will be made and, if we use exclusion, guilty
people will go unpunished because of police mistakes that might not have
occurred had the Court stated an understandable rule to govern police conduct.
Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure: The Recent
Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 472-73 (1985).
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
126. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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for an admitted wrong. The method has too much of the flavor
of throwing out the baby with the bath."'1 Perfect justice is to
ensure not only that no innocent person is found guilty; it is to
ensure also that no guilty person goes free.1' Yet, not only will
wrongdoers go free under the Harlow-Anderson doctrine of qual-
ified immunity, their transgressions will go unremedied as well.
The Supreme Court formulated the Harlow standard with a
view towards dispensing with frivolous lawsuits as early as
possible,12 yet federal courts remain overwhelmed by a massive
volume of civil rights litigation.1 30 Unless this country is facing a
crisis of contempt for the Constitution, the only possible conclu-
sions from that fact are that the doctrine is not working to
exclude frivolous suits, that it is not understood by the parties
and legal community,' 13 or that it has provided a shield for public
officials behind which they have felt free to trample the rights
of their fellow citizens.
Procedural Problems: The Summary Judgment Question
Procedurally, the post-Anderson state of the qualified immunity
doctrine remains confusing to courts and lawyers. If in Anderson
the Court sought to clarify qualified immunity questions, it failed
miserably. To date, the issue of qualified immunity under Ander-
son has been litigated over four hundred times in federal courts
alone.1 32 The bulk of this confusion results from the application
of the principal benefit of qualified immunity: the decision at
summary judgment.ee
The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is "to deter-
mine whether an issue set forth in the pleadings is in fact in
dispute, and, if not, to eliminate any portion of the case for which
trial is not required."' Although courts generally have applied
the correct standard for summary judgment-that no genuine
127. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Speech by Judge W. Cox, United States Court of Military Appeals, Norfolk Naval
Station, Virginia (June 1989) (paraphrasing).
129. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
130. See supra note '19.
131. For an exploration of this idea in greater depth, see infra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text.
132. The basis of this assertion is computerized legal research conducted. on January 29,
1990, encompassing all reported federal cases citing Anderson in the digest or synopsis of
the case.
133. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
134. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE S 9.1, at 433 (1985).
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issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law' 35 -- the qualified immunity process
alters the determination of what constitutes a material fact. The
issue is often not what the officer actually did,13 but how clearly
established the law was for the situation at issue and whether a
reasonable officer should have known that the actions he allegedly
took were illegal.13 7 The judge's role in making the summary
judgment determination therefore hinges largely upon how the
judge decides the three interrelated issues involved in the qual-
ified immunity/summary judgment question:
1. What was the factual situation at the time of the alleged
constitutional tort?138
2. What constitutes the "reasonable officer?" 139
3. How clearly established was the law applicable to the situ-
ation? 40
Fulfillment of the "clearly established" standard depends greatly
upon the facts of the situation and on how specifically the court
defines the situation. The Supreme Court addressed the problem
in Anderson, but provided no clear guidance.14' The determination
of the law is clearly a judicial function, but the court must
evaluate the "clearly established" question with regard to the
framework of the "reasonable officer," not that of the judge. 142
Finding the Facts: Judge or Jury
The right to a jury trial is embedded in our legal tradition
and guaranteed by the seventh amendment. 43 Nonetheless, the
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment "shall be rendered . . .if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id.
136. The court may not focus upon what the officer actually did because courts, in
evaluating motions for summary judgment, must view the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. If the defendant officer is the moving party, the court therefore
will view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.
KANE, & A. MILLER, supra note 134, S 9.3, at 43940.
137. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
138. See infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 157-85 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
141. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40.
142. Id. at 640. According to the Court, "The contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right. . . . [Tihe unlawfulness must be apparent." Id.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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function of the jury is to serve only as a finder of fact, whereas
the function of the judge is to decide questions of law.144 This
fact/law division of duty is firmly grounded in the Anglo-American
conception of ordered liberty. It arises from the same principles
that underlie our form of republican government and provides a
balance between freedom and excessive self-interest.1
45
Courts have had little difficulty respecting the boundary be-
tween judge and jury in qualified immunity cases in which the
facts are not in dispute or the court can readily resolve the
questions in the plaintiff's favor. In many cases, however, key
facts concerning information known by the official are beyond
the plaintiffs knowledge. Without the opportunity to probe an
official's credibility, courts must rely on the facts as presented
by affidavits or discovery. 46 As the Supreme Court noted in
Illinois v. Gates,'47 fourth amendment questions turn on "partic-
ular factual contexts,"' and in Anderson, "The relevant question
• . . is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question.' ' 49 In granting
summary judgment based upon qualified immunity, courts often
must usurp the jury's factfinding role.
144. See M. KANE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 173 (1979); cf. 28 U.S.C. 5 1872 (1988) (issues of fact
in Supreme Court).
145. Blackstone noted the democratic value of balancing the magistracy with a jury:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and
our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely intrusted
to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the
prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite
of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards
those of their own rank and dignity; it is not to be expected from human
nature, that the few should be always attentive to the interests and good of
the many. On the other hand, if the power of judicature were placed at random
in the hands of the multitude, their decisions would be wild and capricious,
and a new rule of action would be every day established in our courts. It is
wisely therefore ordered, that the principles and axioms of law, which are
general propositions, flowing from abstracted reason, and not accommodated
to times or to men, should be deposited in the breasts of the judges, to be
occasionally applied to such facts as come properly ascertained before them.
For here partiality can have little scope: the law is well known, and is the
same for all ranks and degrees; it follows as a regular conclusion from the
premises of fact pre-established.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMIENTARIES *37980.
146. E.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 724 F. Supp. 654, 655-56, 661 (). Minn. 1989). In
Anderso. the only source of information about the basis of Anderson's probable cause to
believe that Dixon was in the Creighton house was Anderson himself; yet the plaintiff
could not challenge Anderson's credibility in the context of the motion for summary
judgment. Cf. id. at 656 (the court accepted Anderson's affidavit and deposition as factually
correct without evaluating his credibility).
147. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
148. Id. at 232.
149. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
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Federal circuit courts generally have been willing to allow
federal district courts to decide dispositive factual questions in
determining matters of intent in qualified immunity cases.1e Their
reliance on judicial factfinding of intent may be misguided, how-
ever-at least according to Justice Scalia, the author of the
Anderson decision. In Halperin v. Kissinger,'-" then-Judge Scalia
stated that "it is impossible to place '[rleliance on the objective
reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference
to clearly established law,' when clearly established law makes
the conduct legal or illegal depending upon the intent with which
it is performed."'15 2 Despite that admonition, courts have not
hesitated either to decide questions of intent as matters of law
or to hold intent irrelevant in the qualified immunity context.1a
An example of the courts' tendency to cling tenaciously to the
"objective" language of Harlow-Anderson is Walnut Properties,
Inc. v. City of Whittier, 54 in which the central issue involved the
City Council's intent in reenacting an ordinance against adult
businesses that a federal district court previously had held un-
constitutional. 5  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit granted summary judgment based upon qualified
immunity, asserting that "[t]he test is wholly objective, and we
do not inquire into the actual subjective intent of the official."' ' 6
Finding the "Reasonable Officer"
The summary judgment process breaks down even further
when the crucial question of fact becomes one of "reasonable-
ness." As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "The distinction
between the functions of court and jury does not come in question
150. See, e.g., Yalkut v. Gemignani, 873 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1989) (whether Internal
Revenue Service agents acted beyond their authority in levying on attorney's bank account);
Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 1988) (whether
reenactment of ordinance previously held unconstitutional was done with wrongful intent),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 432 (6th Cir. 1988) (whether
supervisors acted with discriminatory intent), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989); Rakovich v.
Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1204 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (whether plaintiffs dismissal from police
department was based upon improper intent), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988).
151. 807 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
152. Id. at 184 (citation omitted).
153. See supra note 150. Indeed, "[w]hether conduct violates constitutional rights often
depends upon the intent that characterizes the conduct." Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 62.
154. 861 F.2d 1102.
155. Id. at 1110.
156. Id. at 1111 (citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984)).
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until the parties differ as to the standard of conduct."'157 The
problem is that because so many factors are involved in deter-
mining what is or is not reasonable, "[a] standard which requires
only conduct proportionate to the circumstances and the risk
seldom, if ever, can be made a matter of absolute rule."'l'
Whether a judge may determine "reasonable man" questions
as a matter of law has divided judges since the Holmes-Cardozo
railroad crossing cases.159 Although current federal practice has
the jury decide reasonable person questions,'160 the Supreme Court
in Harlow and Anderson encouraged the lower courts to dispose
of seemingly frivolous cases as early as possible through summary
judgment.161
The wide variety of ways in which federal circuit courts have
resolved qualified immunity questions amply demonstrates the
confusion surrounding the doctrine.1 62 Although all of the circuits
157. O.W. HOLMES, THE CO MON LAW 114-15 (1938)..
158. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.-KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 5 35, at 219 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
159. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R!R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) with Pokora v.
Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). In Goodman, Holmes attempted to "flay] down a standard
once for all," requiring an automobile driver approaching a railroad crossing with an
obstructed view to stop, look, and listen, and if he could not be sure otherwise that no
train was coming, to get out of the car. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70. Justice Cardozo discarded
that rule in Pokora, holding that the failure to get out of one's car at obstructed crossings
was not necessarily unreasonable: "Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for
caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law. ... Extraordinary
situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for
the common-place or normal." Pokora, 292 U.S. at 105-06.
160. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, 10A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 2729,
at 194 (2d ed. 1983) ("[Plarticular deference has been accorded the jury . . .in light of its
supposedly unique competence in applying the reasonable man standard to a given fact
situation.").
161. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646-47 n.6 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
162. Compare Harrell v. United States, 875 F.2d 828 (11th Cir. 1989) (whether Coast
Guard arrest, stripsearch, and detention were reasonable); Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384
(8th Cir. 1989) (whether destruction of house by police gunfire and burning to apprehend
murder suspect was reasonable); Henry v. Perry, 866 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1989) (whether use
of deadly force against escaping prisoner was reasonable); Osabutey v. Welch, 857 F.2d 220
(4th Cir. 1988) (whether the search of a suspect and his automobile based upon an informant's
tip was reasonable); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988) (whether defendant
supervisors' belief that their interest in office efficiency outweighed the plaintiffs first
amendment interests was reasonable) with Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989)
(whether medical treatment of prisoner was reasonable); Feagley v. Waddill, 868 F.2d 1437
(5th Cir. 1989) (whether conduct of officials at state school for mentally retarded was
reasonable); Walters v. Western State Hosp., 864 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1988) (whether state
hospital's treatment of patient with isolation and psychotropic drugs was reasonable); Unwin
v. Campbell, 863 F2d 124 (1st Cir. 1988) (whether prison guard's actions in subduing inmates
were reasonable).
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have applied the Harlow-Anderson standard, they have varied in
their willingness to decide what is or is not reasonable conduct
as a matter of law. In general, courts have been more willing to
decide reasonableness as a matter of law in cases involving law
enforcement officials as defendants than they have been in cases
involving physicians. 163
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
illustrated this difference in approach in two recent decisions. In
Harrell v. United States,16 4 the court found that a reasonable
Coast Guard officer in the defendant's position could have be-
lieved his actions were lawful. 6 5 In Waldrop v. Evans' 66 however,
the court found that the interpretation of the quality of care
provided by the defendant doctors was a question of material
fact which precluded summary judgment. 67 The court is certainly
well suited to decide matters of law, but it is unlikely to have
any more experience as to what a "reasonable Coast Guard
officer" would believe than what a "reasonable doctor" would
believe. 68 Yet, although the court realized that it lacked the
professional medical expertise to evaluate the actions of a phy-
sician, it did not similarly conclude that only a professional law
enforcement officer could accurately evaluate the reactions of
another officer. 169
Judges who nonetheless undertake to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of an officer's conduct must determine how to assess actions
taken under the stress of urgent law enforcement situations.
Because cases involving questions of the reasonableness of police
conduct present very fine shades of distinction between approved
and disapproved police conduct' 70 courts may be ill-suited to
163. See supra note 162.
164. 875 F.2d 828.
165. Id. at 831.
166. 871 F.2d 1030.
167. Id. at 1035-36.
168. See Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScL 433, 444-45 (1967). Schwartz notes that courts generally
must follow police judgment, "for what else can the judge really do? . ., if the officer whos
[sic] conduct is under review is an experienced patrolman, which the judge almost never
is." Id. at 445.
169. Harrell, 875 F.2d at 831.
170. Compare United States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding unreasonable
officer's detention of a suspect for 25 minutes because suspect cooperated fully and no
additional suspicion developed) with United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding reasonable officer's detention of a suspect for over one hour in case in which
suspect gave implausible answers to questions). See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, &
J. ISRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 285 (1990) (on distinguishing permissible from imper-
missible conduct).
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evaluate "all of [the] subtle considerations to be balanced by the
[officer] on the spot, in a matter of seconds or minutes."'171
The question of which standard judges-or juries, for that
matter-should use to evaluate the reasonableness of an official's
conduct or knowledge of the law further complicates the issue.
Is the "reasonable officer" standard to be a national standard-
similar to the general standard in medical malpractice cases-a
local standard, or an agency standard? 72 An additional question
is the degree to which the standard either takes into account
the official's training or, alternatively, makes him potentially
liable for his agency's failure to disseminate legal information
properly.'73 What may be unreasonable to a college-educated FBI
agent in Washington, D.C., may seem quite reasonable to a young
Customs patrol officer in Beaufort, North Carolina. As Justice
O'Connor noted in her dissenting opinion in Illinois v. Krull,74
"it is not apparent how much constitutional law the reasonable
officer is expected to know."' 75
Two recent section 1983 cases involving allegations of excessive
police force provide a comparison of the disparate outcomes
possible under the Harlow-Anderson standard. In Thorsted v.
Kelly, 76 the plaintiff alleged that a Beverly Hills, California, police
officer used excessive force by handcuffing her after she attacked
him and grabbed his pistol in a scuffle. 77 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "the question of
whether a reasonable officer placed in the circumstances faced
by Kelly could reasonably believe that his conduct was legal is
a fact-specific one, and was appropriately given to the jury."'7 8
171. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE, & J. ISRAEL, supra note 170, at 448.
172. Under a local standard, judges determining reasonableness would consider the nature
of the geographic area in which the defendant acted. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
158, 5 32, at 187-88. Reasonableness would thus mean very different things to officials in
an undeveloped rural area such as the Texas border area than it would to officials in an
urban area such as Boston, Massachusetts. Under an agency standard, the reasonableness
of an official's action could depend upon the agency in which the defendant served. Cf. id.
For example, Customs Service standards could find reasonable actions that Coast Guard
standards would find unreasonable.
173. See generally S. WASBY, SiaALL TowN POLICE AND THE SUPRME COURT 217-23 (1976)
(discussing the limited dissemination of new law to police officers).
174. 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (allowing the admission of evidence obtained during a search
conducted pursuant to a statute that a federal district court found unconstitutional one day
after the search).
175. Id. at 367 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. 858 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1988).
177. Id. at 572.
178. Id. at 575.
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In Graham v. Connor,179 a recent Supreme Court case, a police
officer, unaware that Graham was a diabetic suffering from an
insulin reaction, became suspicious after watching Graham dash
into and then out of a store.180 The officer stopped Graham to
investigate the matter, but ignored Graham's explanation of his
situation and pleas for help and inflicted several serious injuries
upon him.'8' The district court granted a directed verdict for the
officer on the question of the use of excessive force,18 2 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 18
Although the officer did not seek qualified immunity, the Su-
preme Court noted that "the officer's objective 'good faith' - that
is, whether he could reasonably have believed that the force used
did not violate the fourth amendment-may be relevant to the
availability of the qualified immunity defense to monetary liabil-
ity."'84 The Court then remanded to the court of appeals "for
reconsideration . . . under the proper Fourth Amendment stan-
dard."18 5 Given that both the district court and the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the officer's actions were constitutional prior to
the Supreme Court's hearing of the case, the officer probably
will avoid liability on remand under a qualified immunity defense.
Determining When Law is Clearly Established
The judicial determination of whether the law that the official
allegedly violated is "clearly established" hinges upon the reso-
lution of the two foregoing questions: the factual situation in
which the officer acted and the reasonableness of the officer's
belief that the questioned acts were not unlawful in that con-
text.186 In addition, although the Court in Anderson noted that
"the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been
'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more
relevant sense,"'187 its opinion did not provide any clear rule
establishing how particularized the situation must be other than
that "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
179. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
180. Id. at 389.
181. Id at 389-90.
182. 644 F. Supp. 246 (W.D.N.C. 1986).
183. 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987).
184. Graham, 490 U.S. at 399 n.12.
185. Id. at 399.
186. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
187. Id. at 640.
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reasonable official would understand that what he is doing vio-
lates that right."1 s
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
demonstrated the potential for such a standard to become vir-
tually meaningless in its decision in Rakovich v. Wade.5 9 The
plaintiff in Rakovich alleged that officials charged him with crimes
in retaliation for his criticisms of local police departments. 90
Dismissing the claim, the court held that precedents must be
very closely analogous for the law to be clearly established,
noting that "the balancing of competing interests .. .is so fact
dependent that the 'law' can rarely be considered 'clearly estab-
lished.' "191 Even though a number of precedents had held that
retaliatory action based upon a person's assertion of first amend-
ment rights was improper, none had considered quite the same
facts as those at issue in the case at bar. As a result, the court
held, the law was not clearly established, and a directed verdict
under qualified immunity was proper. 92 Under such a standard,
the doctrine of qualified immunity approaches the level of abso-
lute immunity.
In deciding whether the law is clearly established, courts
typically will look at the law from a lawyer's, not a law enforce-
ment officer's, perspective. They also look to the constitutional,
statutory, or case law in effect at the time of the alleged acts.193
For decisional law, courts consider Supreme Court decisions,
decisions within their circuit, and cases from other circuits. 94
Few courts, if any, consider the law from the viewpoint of the
188. Id-
189. 850 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (court granted summary judgment based upon
qualified immunity).
190. Id. at 1183-87.
191. Id. at 1213 (quoting Benson v. Allphin (Benson II), 786 F.2d 268, 276 & n.18 (7th Cir.
1986)):
[T]here is one type of constitutional rule, namely that involving the balancing
of competing interests, for which the standard may be clearly established, but
its application is so fact dependent that the "law" can rarely be considered
"clearly established." . . . It would appear that whenever a balancing of
interests is required, the facts of the existing caselaw must closely correspond
to the contested action before the defendant official is subject to liability under
[Harlow]. With Harlow's [tic] elimination of the inquiry into actual motivations
of the official, qualified immunity typically casts a wide net to protect govern-
ment officials from damage liability whenever balancing is required. 8
18. There may, of course, be a situation in which the defendant's actions are
so egregious that the result of the balancing test will be a foregone conclusion,
even though prior caselaw may not address the specific facts at issue.
192. I& at 1213-14.
193. See, e.g., Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir. 1988).
194. I&
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officer, who is likely to have only the most basic knowledge of
the law.195 That knowledge is limited by the training provided
by the officer's agency, which is almost certain to take months
to disseminate new law.196
Jurisprudential Problems
Duplication of the Probable Cause Standard
In Llaguno v. Mingey,197 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
bitingly criticized the Harlow standard of qualified immunity,
which distinguished between the fourth amendment standard of
reasonableness and the qualified immunity standard of reasona-
bleness. Giving defendants two opportunities to establish "rea-
sonableness," remarked Posner, was like giving "two bites at the
apple."98
Justice Scalia attempted to rebut that criticism in Anderson
by stating that conduct that would be unreasonable within the
meaning of the fourth amendment might still be "objectively
195. See generally H. UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 98-101 (1988) (describing the "confident
misunderstandings" of police in the field). Uviller, a law professor who spent a year working
with New York City patrol officers, noted that although many officers were sensitive to
legal constraints on their actions, they tended to adopt a ritualistic understanding of how
those rules actually operate. Id.
196. See S. WASBY, supra note 173, at 217-23. See generally R. HARIS, THE POLICE
ACADEMY: AN INSIDE VIEW 98-107 (1973) (describing the lack of effectiveness of police
training on constitutional issues); H. UVILLER, supra note 195 (providing a lawyer's view of
how police go about their day-to-day business).
In Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), the Court ruled that stopping a suspect
with a police roadblock constituted a seizure, which could be either reasonable or unrea-
sonable depending upon the circumstances involved. I& at 598-600. On remand from the
Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the roadblock at which the plaintiffs decedent died could
be unreasonable if it was set up as alleged. 884 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1989). After
Brower, any officer who successfully sets up a roadblock to stop a fleeing felon may be
subject to damages for a constitutional tort alleging an unreasonable seizure. Even if the
officer is aware of this recent statement of the constitutional status of roadblocks, however,
the Court has provided scant guidance on what constitutes a "reasonable" roadblock.
197. 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
198. Id at 1569. In explaining his position, Posner wrote:
The question whether they had probable cause depends on what they reason-
ably believed with reference to the facts that confronted them, as the judge
instructed in the passage we quoted earlier. To go on and instruct the jury
further that even if the police acted without probable cause they should be
exonerated if they reasonably (though erroneously) believed that they were
acting reasonably is to confuse the jury and give the defendants two bites at
the apple.
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legally reasonable" for the purpose of qualified immunity.199 He
described the problem as one of semantics only, asserting that
the "reasonably unreasonable" argument would not be available
if "an equally serviceable term, such as 'undue' searches and
seizures [had] been employed." 0 Scalia noted that "regardless of
the terminology used," the boundaries of constitutionality rep-
resent a reasonable "accommodation between governmental need
and individual freedom."20 1
The Court failed to realize that the justification for creating a
distinction between reasonableness for qualified immunity pur-
poses and reasonableness for fourth amendment purposes implied
an anomaly which could threaten its recent probable cause juris-
prudence. In its decision in Anderson, the Court declared that
"[w]e have frequently observed, and our many cases on the point
amply demonstrate, the difficulty of determining whether partic-
ular searches or seizures comport with the Fourth Amend-
ment."2 2 The Court's cases on point, however, demonstrate a
contrary proposition -that the fourth amendment standard is a
"common-sense, practical question"203 based upon "'the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' "204 In Illinois v.
Gates,25 decided in 1983, and more recently in Graham v. Con-
nor,10 decided in 1989, the Court affirmed a "totality of the
circumstances" test as a practical standard for determining fourth
amendment questions.207 The objectively reasonable standard for
199. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 64344 (1987).
200. Id- at 643.
201. Id. at 643-44.
202. Id. at 644 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). The passage in MaVey
that the Court cited, however, noted only that qualified immunity protects "all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law" Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. The
Court in Anderson apparently attempted to make the point that only the "incompetent"
would be unreasonably unreasonable. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644.
203. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
204. Id- at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
205. 462 U.S. 213.
206. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
207. See id. at 396-97 (holding that the totality of the circumstances determines reason-
ableness of force); Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (holding that the totality of the circumstances
forms the basis for probable cause for search warrants); see also United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that the use of "drug courier profiles" is constitutional); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the totality of circumstances determines
the constitutionality of the school officials' searches of students); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to
reasonable reliance on a defective search warrant).
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qualified immunity that the Court set out in Anderson2 8 thus
appears indistinguishable from the objectively reasonable stan-
dard for the fourth amendment that it set out in Graham.20 9
The use of the objectively reasonable standard for both the
qualified immunity and the constitutionality questions poses pro-
cedural as well as substantive hazards. When a court decides the
qualified immunity issue, it may be deciding the merits of the
plaintiffs claim as well.210 In the context of criminal trials, in
which judges must pass on suppression motions, Oliver Wendell
Holmes may have been accurate in noting that "to this day the
question of probable cause is always passed on by the court."21'
In the context of civil trials, however, whether an officer had
probable cause is more properly a question for the jury, and the
court should grant summary judgment only if no reasonable jury
could find that probable cause existed.212
By saying that probable cause did not exist, a court in effect
says that a reasonable officer would not believe that he was
justified in taking the action involved. In other words, the actions
are objectively unreasonable. The Anderson question of whether
the law was clearly established at the time the officer acted
should be considered more properly as a single factual element
of the constitutional question, rather than as a separate test for
immunity. A judicial decision on the constitutionality of certain
actions reflects societal concerns, balancing of competing policies,
and jurisprudence, as well as reasonableness. Thus, an officer
could view clearly established law as objectively unreasonable in
some situations, just as he could view some actions as unreason-
able even in the absence of clearly established law.213
208. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
209. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. Similarly, the Court held that the objectively reasonable
standard it applied in Maley was the same standard it applied in Leon. Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. 897).
210. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immunity in Section
1988 Actions for a Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 61, 107 (1989).
211. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 157, at 115.
212. See White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1986).
213. See R. HAmIs, supra note 196, at 102-03, for a discussion of police instructors'
feelings about constitutional law. According to Harris, many police instructors have told
their recruits that Miranda warnings are unnecessary and adverse to law enforcement. Id.
Compare the reasonableness of the law enforcement officers' actions in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (in which
officers entered plaintiffs home and arrested him without a warrant), with those at issue
in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (in which officer inflicted injuries upon diabetic who
was suffering from an insulin reaction).
764 [Vol. 32:733
1991] THE ILLUSION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Inhibition of Constitutional Development
The qualified immunity doctrine also does not give full consid-
eration to the societal and citizen interests implicated in a con-
stitutional tort lawsuit. The plaintiff bringing a suit alleging a
constitutional tort has two interests at stake: compensation for
the constitutional injury and establishment or vindication of a
constitutional right. Cases dismissed under the qualified immu-
nity doctrine fail to determine whether officials in fact violated
plaintiffs' rights. As a result, the constitutional boundaries of
official action remain unclear and undeveloped.
A number of court decisions upholding grants of qualified
immunity explicitly declined to determine the fundamental ques-
tion of whether the acts complained of were in fact lawful.214 The
unspoken assertion in such cases was that the courts themselves
did not know what the law was in the situation at bar and would
not go to the trouble of determining the law because a motion
for summary judgment did not require such a determination.
The qualified immunity doctrine in effect represents a policy
decision that, for cases falling within gray areas, the need for
vigorous action by public officials outweighs a plaintiff's desire
for compensation. 215 The doctrine does not take into account the
societal interest in clarifying and protecting constitutional rights.
214. See Harrell v. United States, 875 F.2d 828, 831 (11th Cir. 1989). In HarreU, the
plaintiff asked the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to consider the
constitutionality of the reboarding of a vessel and the arrest, search, and detention of its
crew by Coast Guard boarding officers. Id. at 830-31. Rather than answer the question, the
court stated:
Lt. Atkin appears not to have violated the constitution at all; but, if he did,
we have no reluctance to say that a reasonable officer in Lt. Atkin's position
would have believed his actions were lawful. This is sufficient for immunity,
and we find Lt. Atkin entitled to qualified immunity as to the constitutional
torts.
Id. at 831; see also Osabutey v. Welch, 857 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1988). In Osabutey, the plaintiffs
brought a S 1983 action alleging that the defendant officers conducted an unconstitutional
search and seizure when they detained and searched the plaintiffs and their car based upon
an informant's tip. Id at 221-23. Instructing the district court to grant summary judgment
for the police defendants, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
asserted:
Exigent circumstances vary from case to case, and a determination of the
issue is of necessity fact-specific. Although it is tempting, we need not, and
do not, decide whether the search of plaintiffs was constitutional. Rather, our
inquiry is limited to whether the officers could reasonably believe that their
action was permissible within the limits of clearly established constitutional
principles.
Id at 224 (citing United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 1981)).
215. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982).
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In the criminal justice context, by contrast, clarifying and pro-
tecting constitutional rights is paramount; courts refuse to admit
evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, even when
such a refusal requires courts to set free dangerous criminals. 216
In creating the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court concluded,
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty
to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embod-
iment in the fundamental law of the land.
217
As the Court noted when it extended the exclusionary rule to
the states in Mapp v. Ohio,2 8 "Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse,
its disregard of the charter of its own existence. 219
In the context of a civil suit, however, the qualified immunity
doctrine sets up a Catch-22 situation. The law is not clearly
established, so qualified immunity protects the official's actions.
The law remains unclear because the case is resolved through
the immunity defense and the courts never determine the law.
The immunity doctrine thus freezes constitutional law in the civil
context, leaving its clarification almost exclusively to the criminal
context.220 The resulting chilling effect on constitutional law is
216. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914); see also Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1977) (reversing conviction for murder of 10-year-old girl because police
statement to defendant that girl deserved a "Christian burial" was impermissible police
coercion); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (reversing convictions in five joined cases
because police interrogation practices violated the fifth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (overturning conviction because search did not comply with the fourth amendment);
People v. Redd, 135 IlM. 2d 252, 553 N.E.2d 316 (1990) (reversing conviction for rape and
murder of 3- and 5-year-old sisters despite extensive incriminating evidence because of
impermissible use of a witness' grand jury testimony); State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 576
A.2d 834 (1990) (reversing murder conviction because confessions violated defendant's right
to remain silent). But cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990) (creating a "routine
booking question" exception to Miranda); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating
a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule for reasonable reliance on an invalid search
warrant); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (creating an "inevitable discovery" exception
to the exclusionary rule).
217. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
218. 367 U.S. 643.
219. Id at 659.
220. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968). As the Court explained in Terry:
[1]n our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial
process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with
constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents ...
[but] the exclusionary rule ... is powerless to deter invasions of constitution-
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clearly contrary to the wisdom Thomas Jefferson expressed when
he wrote that "[n]o society can make a perpetual constitution, or
even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living
generation."221
The qualified immunity doctrine thus poses an added danger
in that it may greatly restrict the protection of constitutional
rights.2 Anderson v. Creighton provides a vivid example of
how the doctrine freezes constitutional law and exposes citizens
to greater police latitude. Because the Court resolved Anderson
by summary judgment without reaching the principal issue of
whether exigent circumstances justified the search of the Creigh-
ton residence, the Court did not clearly establish the constitu-
tional law with regard to exigent circumstances in similar
situations. The qualified immunity standard thus denied not only
satisfaction of the Creightons' rights, but also clear guidance to
well-meaning law enforcement officers who may find themselves
in the same situation as Anderson. Dissenting in Anderson, Justice
Stevens wrote, "I see no reason why the family's interest in the
security of its own home should be accorded a lesser weight than
the Government's interest in carrying out an invasion that was
unlawful."
STATUTORY PROTECTION UNDER THE FTCA:
FIGHT THAT CLAIM ALONE?
The Imperfect Protection of the FTCA
The Supreme Court is not to blame for the problems arising
under the qualified immunity doctrine, however. The problem is
that the doctrine represents a patchwork judicial solution to an
ally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting
or are willing to forego successful prosecutions in the interest of serving some
other goal.
Id.
221. T. JEFFERSON, Letter to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THoaAs
JEFFERSON 392, 395-96 (J. Boyd ed. 1958), quoted in R. MATTHEWS, THE RADiCAL POLITICS
OF THomAs JEFFERSON: A REvISIONIST ViEw 22-23 (1984).
222. For a discussion of this danger, see The Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 220:
[In Anderson], [t]he Court also made clear that Harlow will now protect not
only high-level officials of the executive branch but also officers in the field.
Taken together, the Court's rulings extend to law enforcement officers a new
layer of protection that threatens to increase the number of unremedied
violations of the fourth amendment.
223. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
224. Id. at 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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inherently legislative problem. Immunizing public officials impli-
cates important policy decisions regarding the social value of
protecting officials from lawsuits arising from the performance
of their duties. As the Court noted in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,2
costs "of this immunization include the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, the de-
terrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office," and
the cooling of officials' ardor in the discharge of their offices.26
Although Congress has acted to immunize federal officials from
common law torts,22 it has expressly declined to do so for
constitutional torts.228
In the FTCA, Congress provided that the government would
be liable for the negligent or wrongful acts of its employees,
"acting within the scope of [their] . . . employment, under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred." 22 The original act, however,
expressly excluded claims arising out of law enforcement activi-
ties.2s0
225. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
226. Id. at 814.
227. See 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(b)(1) (1988), which provides:
The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672
of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising
or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment
is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by
reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act or omission
gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any other civil
action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same
subject matter against the employee or the employee's estate is precluded
without regard to when the act or omission occurred.
228. See id. 2679(b(2), which provides:
Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee
of the Government-
(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States,
or
(B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under
which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.
See also 134 CONG. REC. S15,600 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988) (discussing 1988 amendments to
the FTCA as a response to "an immediate crisis of personal liability for the entire Federal
workforce" for common law torts while leaving unaffected the right to Bivens actions or
constitutional tort claims).
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
230. See id. S 2680(h) (proviso inserted by 1974 amendments) (see infra note 241). The
original act included the following exceptions:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
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In 1972, frustrated with congressional inaction, the Supreme
Court created a cause of action for constitutional torts allegedly
committed by federal officers in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotis.231 As Chief Justice Burger
conceded in his remarkable dissent, "[A]n unlawful act against a
totally innocent person-such as petitioner claims to be-has
been left without an effective remedy.
2s
Burger did not dispute the compelling nature of Bivens' com-
plaint, but noted that "[t]his case has significance far beyond its
facts and its holding." The Chief Justice took issue with the
majority's judicial creation of a damage remedy in violation of
the separation of powers doctrine: "Legislation is the business
of the Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that
task-as we do not."4
After a few introductory paragraphs, Burger dedicated the
remainder of his dissent to exploring the weaknesses of a pre-
viously created judicial remedy for violation of constitutional
rights-the exclusionary rule. The Chief Justice concluded that
"Congress should develop an administrative or quasi-judicial rem-
edy against the Government itself to afford compensation and
restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated. The venerable doctrine of respondeat superior in
our tort law provides an entirely appropriate conceptual basis
for this remedy."= 5
The Chief Justice gave as an example the hypothetical situation
of a security guard who assaults a customer.P6 Under tort law,
Burger noted, the customer would have a cause of action against
to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
ii) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit,
or interference with contract rights ...
Id-
231. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
232. Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
236. Id-
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the employer.m "Such a statutory scheme would have the added
advantage of providing some remedy to the completely innocent
persons who are sometimes the victims of illegal police conduct-
something that the [exclusionary rule], of course, can never ac-
complish."238 In addition, Burger noted that damage verdicts for
the acts of employees have often been big enough "to provide
an effective deterrent and stimulate employers to corrective
action."239 The Chief Justice actually went so far as to spell out
recommended provisions for a statute dealing with allegations of
the commission of constitutional torts by federal officials.240
In 1974, Congress responded to the Bivens decision by extend-
ing the FTCA to claims arising out of the acts or omissions of
law enforcement officers of the United States, including claims
of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, and malicious prosecution. 241 Nonetheless, Congress did
237. Id. (citing W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS S 68, at 470-80 (3d ed. 1964)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 421 n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
240. Burger recommended the following provisions:
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the illegal acts of law enforcement
officials committed in the performance of assigned duties;
(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any person
aggrieved, by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth
Amendment or statutes regulating official conduct;
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature or perhaps patterned
after the United States Court of Claims, to adjudicate all claims under the
statute;
(d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of
evidence secured for use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment; and
(e) a provision directing that no evidence, otherwise admissible, shall be
excluded from any criminal proceeding because of violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 422-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
241. See 28 U.S.C. S 2680 (1988), which lists the following exceptions:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to-
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit,
or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or
omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States
Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title
shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this
proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "inves-
tigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States
who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make
arrests for violations of Federal law.
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not extinguish the Bivens action, as the Court noted in Carlson
v. Green.242 In Carlson, the Court held that Congress intended
the FTCA and Bivens to provide "parallel, complementary causes
of action."243
Opportunity Avoided: The 1988 Amendments to the FTCA
In 1988, the Supreme Court dealt a heavy blow to federal
employees' immunity from suit in Westfall v. Erwin.244 The Court
held that government employees would be immune only for acts
that were both discretionary, rather than ministerial, and within
the scope of the employees' duties.245 Reacting to Westfall, Con-
gress moved quickly to plug the new "discretionary gap" in
official immunity.?46 By November 18, 1988, Congress had amended
the FTCA to make it the exclusive cause of action for common
law torts arising from the acts or omissions of government
employees acting within the scope of their duties.247 Congress
failed to include Bivens suits in the exclusivity provisions, how-
ever, expressly exempting constitutional torts from FTCA cov-
erage.248 The report of the Subcommittee on Administrative Law
242. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
243. Id. at 20. The Court quoted congressional comments that accompanied the 1974
FTCA amendments:
[A]fter the date of enactment of this measure, innocent individuals who are
subjected to raids [like that in Bivens] will have a cause of action against the
individual Federal agents and the Federal Government. Furthermore, this
provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty
[sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the
Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct
that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes
liability upon the individual Government officials involved).
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AmaN. NEWS 2789, 2791 (emphasis added by the Court).
244. 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
245. Id. at 297-98.
246. See generally H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADINn. NEWS 5945 (report of the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations, Committee of the Judiciary, recommending legislative action to
negate the impact of the Wesfall decision).
247. On June 28, 1988, the House passed House Resolution 4612, amending the FTCA to
make its remedies exclusive for all civil actions. The resolution as passed may be found at
134 CONG. REC. H4718-20 (daily ed. June 27, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. H-4804 (daily ed. June
28, 1988). The Senate followed suit on October 12, 1988. 134 CONG. REC. S15,597-600 (daily
ed. Oct. 12, 1988). The resolution became Public Law No. 100-694 and was signed into law
on November 18, 1988. 28 U.S.C.A. S 2679 (West 1965 & Supp. 1990).
248. See 134 CONG. REC. S15,600 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988). The exemption was codified at
28 U.S.C. S 2679(b)(2) (1988):
772 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:733
and Governmental Relations, Committee of the Judiciary, ex-
plained the exclusion by noting that "this type of tort [is] a more
serious intrusion of the rights of an individual that merits special
attention. Consequently, [the amendments] would not affect the
ability of victims of constitutional torts to seek personal redress
from Federal employees who allegedly violate their Constitutional
rights ., 249
The executive branch, through the Attorney General's office,
strongly supported the amendments, noting the importance of
respondeat superior protection for governmental employees.2
The Attorney General's office, however, disagreed with the ex-
clusion of constitutional torts from FTCA protection,2 1 but did
not belabor the point. The office stated:
We recognize, however, that such legislation always has been
somewhat controversial because of its constitutional rights
dimension. And while our position on the propriety of a Bivens
bill remains the same, litigating Bivens cases will not much
change as a result of Westfall, which changed the law only as
it concerns common law torts.252
Mark Roth, General Counsel for the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFL-CIO), also recommended the re-
moval of the exclusion to the Subcommittee, noting that section
2676 of the FTCA provides that a judgment under the FTCA is
a bar to any other actions.21 Roth contended that "clarity would
Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee
of the Government-
(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States,
or
(B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under
which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.
249. H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEws 5945, 5950.
250. Hearings, supra note 121, at 71-80 (statement of Robert L. Willmore, Deputy Assist.
Att'y Gen., Civil Div., Dep't of Justice).
251. See id. at 78 for the opinion of Robert L. Willmore, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, Department of Justice:
There is no change, however, in our long-standing belief that persons whose
constitutional rights have been violated by scope-of-employment federal conduct
should also be required to sue the United States, not the employee. As this
Subcommittee is aware, since Bivens was decided in 1971, the Department of
Justice, under both Democratic and Republican Administrations, consistently
has pursued legislation which would make a suit under the FTCA the exclusive
remedy for persons injured by conduct alleged to violate constitutional rights.
252. Id-
253. Hearings, supra note 121, at 173 (statement of Mark D. Roth, Gen. Counsel, Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees (AFL-CIO)).
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be achieved and possible protracted litigation avoided if the
amendment proposed . . . clearly stated that any settlement of,
or judgment entered [under the FTCA]... shall be an absolute
bar against any other civil actions or proceedings arising out of
or relating to the same subject matter."25
Despite these concerns, Congress was interested primarily in
"remedying" the liability threats that the Westfall decision posed,25
and it enacted the FTCA amendments with the exception for
constitutional torts intact.256 In speeches accompanying adoption
of the bill, Congress noted merely that the exclusivity provisions
did not encompass Bivens actions, apparently believing that such
tortious conduct was inherently outside the scope of federal
officials' employment. 257 Thus, despite the amendments to the
FTCA to protect federal officials from common law liability,
officials remain exposed to suit for actions that allegedly violate
constitutional rights.
JUSTICE FOR ALL: BRINGING CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
WITHIN THE FTCA
In the nine years since Chief Justice Burger urged Congress
to take responsibility for all damages resulting from the wrongs
of its servants in his dissent in Bivens,2-8 both the Court and
Congress have expended significant effort in balancing the vin-
dication of constitutional torts against the protection of innocent
officials. These efforts have failed because a fair compromise
between these interests cannot be struck. Both concerns can be
met fully only if the federal government shields its employees
and takes responsibility for the wrongs committed in its name.
The reasoning that accounts for the waiver of sovereign immunity
for common law torts applies with equal force to claims of
constitutional torts.29 Further, including constitutional torts within
the ambit of the FTCA would serve the interests of the govern-
254. Id.
255. See generally H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5945, 5947 (concerning congressional intent to protect federal
employees from liability).
256. 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(b)(2) (1988).
257. See 134 CONG. REC. S15,597-600 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. H4718-20
(daily ed. June 27, 1988).
258. See eupra note 240 and text accompanying notes 232-40.
259. See Hearings, =pra note 121, at 71-80 (statement of Robert L. Willmore, Deputy
Assist. Att'y Gen., Civil Div., Dep't of Justice), id. at 173 (statement of Mark D. Roth, Gen.
Counsel, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees (AFL-CIO)).
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ment as well as federal officials, injured citizens, and society as
a whole. 26 0
Serving Governmental Interests
From the government's point of view, perhaps the most com-
pelling reason for waiving sovereign immunity for constitutional
torts is that doing so would likely save federal expenses in the
long run. Government reports noted an expectation that the
common law tort exclusivity provisions in the 1988 amendments
to the FTCA would result in ultimate cost savings.261 Although
the amendments might encourage plaintiffs to bring more suits
against the United States,
FTCA defenses usually cost less than personal liability de-
fenses, and FTCA cases are almost always easier to settle
than personal liability cases. Also, in the absence of [exclusiv-
ity], federal agencies may feel compelled to indemnify federal
workers for judgments against them, which could result in
greater costs to the federal government than would result
from FTCA judgments.26 2
The Department of Justice currently defends federal employees
against lawsuits for actions that reasonably appear to have been
performed within the scope of employment.263 In many cases, that
260. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). In holding that S 1983 did
not entitle municipalities to immunity, the Court stated in Owen that making governments
liable for committing constitutional wrongs accomplishes three major objectives: it compen-
sates the victim.for the injury received; it immunizes the public official who acts in good
faith from damages "more appropriately chargeable to the populace as a whole;" and it
makes the public liable through the government only when the injury was "inflicted by the
'execution of government's policy."' Id. at 657 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). In addition, the Court noted earlier in its decision
that the threat of damages would "encourage [government decisionmakers] to institute
internal rules and programs designed to minimize the liklihood [sic] of unintentional in-
fringements on constitutional rights." Id. at 652.
261. Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office on H.R. 4612, reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmu. NEWS 5945,
5954-55.
262. Id.
263. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (1990) provides the following:.
Under the procedures set forth below, a federal employee (hereby defined to
include present and former Federal officials and employees) may be provided
representation in civil, criminal, and Congressional proceedings in which he is
sued, subpoenaed, or charged in his individual capacity ... when the actions
for which representation is requested reasonably appear to have been per-
formed within the scope of the employee's employment and .. representation
would otherwise be in the interest of the United States.
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1991] THE ILLUSION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 775
representation is in addition to that of the United States as a
defendant for common law torts under the FTCA, because "com-
mon law tort and constitutional tort claims may be complemen-
tary causes of action. ' '2 4 As a result, the failure to include
constitutional torts in the exclusivity provisions of the FTCA
provides a loophole for litigious plaintiffs, who could sue both
the government on a common law claim and the federal employee
on a constitutional claim based on the same incident, such as an
automobile accident. 25 With constitutional torts excluded from
coverage under the FTCA, the government could thus end up
defending two cases arising out of the same circumstances. Fur-
ther, because the Department of Justice may indemnify federal
employees for damages arising out of official conduct within the
scope of employment,266 the government could even end up paying
damages from two suits arising out of the same circumstances.
A waiver of sovereign immunity also would encourage agencies
to provide administrative remedies for constitutional wrongs,
which would result in further savings. The FTCA requires that
plaintiffs present claims to the agency responsible for the conduct
complained of.26 7 Agencies have wide discretion to resolve claims
administratively and thus avoid the need to take many cases to
trial.2 68
Protecting Federal Officals
Including constitutional torts under FTCA coverage would
effectuate Congress' intent to protect federal employees fully and
264. Hearings, supra note 121, at 174 (statement of Mark D. Roth, Gen. Counsel, Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees (AFL-CIO)).
265. Id. at 173.
The Plaintiff [could seek] judgment for his injury alleging not only the common-
law tort but also a constitutional deprivation of life and limb without due
process. Once judgment is entered under the [FTCA] for damages due to
the injury, the plaintiff continues to pursue actions because of the constitutional
allegation.
266. See 28 C.F.R. S 50.15(12}cl(1), which provides that:
The Department of Justice may indemnify the defendant Department of Justice
employee for any verdict, judgment, or other monetary award which is ren-
dered against such employee, provided that the conduct giving rise to the
verdict, judgment, or award was taken within the scope of employment and
that such indemnification is in the interest of the United States, as determined
by the Attorney General or his designee.
Section (12}{cX3) provides, however, that the Department will not agree to indemnify or
settle the case before entry of an adverse judgment except in extraordinary circumstances.
Section (12)(2)(5) makes indemnification contingent on the availability of appropriated funds.
267. 28 U.S.C. §5 2401(b), 2675 (1988).
268. See zd- S 2672.
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fairly2 9 by including all lawsuits that could arise out of the
performance of their duties. By definition, an official acting within
the scope of his duties acts for the benefit of the government.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,20 the Court noted that exposing an
official to the potential hazards of civil litigation over the per-
formance of public duties carries extensive social costs by deter-
ring vigorous public action.Y1 Statutory protection against those
social costs therefore would be in the interests of both the
government and public officials. In Owen v. City of Independence,272
the Court denied immunity to local governments for section 1983
actions, noting that it would be "fairer" for the costs of such
constitutional violations to be "borne by all the taxpayers."2' 73
Providing statutory protection against suits alleging constitu-
tional torts also would recognize that a significant, if not deter-
minative, factor in the extent of constitutional violations by public
officials may be the quality of training provided to the officials.2 4
Exposing a government employee to suit, damages, and calumny
due in any part to the government's failure to provide adequate
training is unjust.
Disposing of civil damages separately would allow the govern-
ment to evaluate and deter wrongful conduct by officials through
administrative or criminal sanctions without interference in or
from an ongoing civil suit. The agency involved often will be in
a better position to render a more honest and fair evaluation of
the official's conduct because it will be able to determine what
the reasonable officer standard is for that agency.
If the acts complained of are egregious, the official could be
tried under criminal law. 5 Although some theorists may view
269. See 134 CONG. REC. S15,597-600 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. H4718-20
(daily ed. June 27, 1988). See generally H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5945 (concerning the congressional intent to
protect federal employees from personal liability).
270. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
271. Id. at 814.
272. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
273. Id. at 655.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 157-85 for a discussion of the reasonable officer.
275. Several federal laws prohibit wrongful actions by federal officers. For example, 18
U.S.C. S 2236 (1988) proscribes warrantless searches:
Whoever, being an officer, agent, or employee of the United States or any
department or agency thereof, engaged in the enforcement of any law of the
United States, searches any private dwelling used and occupied as such
dwelling without a warrant directing such search, or maliciously and without
reasonable cause searches any other building or property without a search
warrant, shall be fined for a first offense not more than $1,000; and, for a
[Vol. 32:733
THE ILLUSION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
criminal penalties as harsher than civil damages, treating wrong-
ful conduct under criminal law principles would provide additional
protection to the innocent official. To convict, the prosecutor
would have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rather
than by a preponderance of evidence, the standard used in civil
trials. Further, the trial could address squarely the central ques-
tion of the accused official's mental state, rather than attempting
to resolve the issue through the circuitous route used in qualified
immunity cases.276 Thus, if the plaintiff could show that the official
acted with wrongful intent, the court could punish the official
for the wrong done to society as a whole, and the government
would compensate the victim for the wrong inflicted by its
servant, regardless of the jury verdict.
Guarding Individuals' Rights
Including constitutional torts within the FTCA would ensure
that those "more serious intrusion[s] of the rights of an individual
that merit[ ] special attention"m are not denied meaningful re-
dress at law. In a suit against an individual officer, the officer's
financial resources may render a finding for the plaintiff econom-
ically meaninglesszr From the plaintiffs perspective, the usually
limited resources of the individual officer should not restrict
recovery for constitutional violations. As in the general tort
doctrine of respondeat superior, the employer should pay for the
foreseeable wrongs of those who act on his behalf.279 Although
subsequent offense, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
See also id. S 2235, which specifies punishments for the malicious procurement of a search
warrant: "Whoever maliciously and without probable cause procures a search warrant to
be issued and executed, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year." See also id. 5 872, which proscribes extortion by officers or employees of the
United States.
In addition, federal officials may be tried under the full panoply of laws of the state in
which the plaintiff alleges the offense occurred. Defendants may remove such cases to
federal court under 28 U.S.C. S 1442(a), which provides that civil and criminal actions
"commenced in a State court against [federal officials] may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein
it is pending."
276. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-17 (1982) (discussing the difficulty
of establishing subjective intent at summary judgment as a justification for an objective
reasonableness standard).
277. H.R. REP. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADIN. NEWS 5945, 5950.
278. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42-44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
279. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 158, SS 69-71, at 499-516.
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many reasons support the theory of respondeat superior,280 the
underlying premise is that an enterprise should bear its own
losses.sl In many cases, only the governmental agency will be
able to determine whether the alleged wrongs were authorized;
the victim of the official misconduct may have no way of knowing
at the time of the incident. As the Court noted in Bivens, "[P]ower,
once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is
wrongfully used.' ' 2
Perhaps most importantly, including constitutional torts within
the FTCA could greatly reduce the number of cases federal
district courts summarily dismiss before reaching the merits of
the constitutional claim. This reduction would enable citizens to
vindicate their constitutional rights by seeking unilateral admin-
istrative action from the agency involved or through a trial
against the United States on the merits of the claim.m Further,
a comparision of the benefits of marginally lawful action with
the costs of paying for the damages incurred may encourage the
government to avoid testing the limits of constitutionally per-
missible behavior.284
CONCLUSION
Throughout its development, the doctrine of qualified immunity
has represented an uneasy balance between the desire to afford
a remedy to a wronged citizen and the need to allow public
officials to pursue their duties without fear of frivolous lawsuits.
Despite the Supreme Court's best efforts, it has been unable to
strike that balance. Cases following the Court's most recent
pronouncement on qualified immunity in Anderson v. Creighton25
have illustrated the practical, procedural, and jurisprudential
limitations to the doctrine. The problem is a legislative one. As
Chief Justice Burger noted none-too-subtly in Bivens, the respon-
280. Id. S 69, at 500. The reasons Prosser gives for vicarious liability of the master
include the following: the master exercises "'control' over the behavior of the servant; he
has 'set the whole thing in motion,' . . . he has selected the servant and trusted him"; and
he has enjoyed the fruits of the servant's labor and so should bear the costs. Id-
281. Id.
282. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392 (1971).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 214-24 for a discussion of the qualified immunity
doctrine's impact on the development of constitutional law.
284. See supra note 260.
285. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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sibility for balancing the competing policy concerns must rest
with Congress:
"And if it be true that the holders of legislative power are
careless or evil, yet the constitutional duty of the court remains
untouched; it cannot rightly attempt to protect the people, by
undertaking a function not its own. On the other hand, by
adhering rigidly to its own duty, the court will help, as nothing
else can, to fix the spot where responsibility lies, and to bring
down on that precise locality the thunderbolt of popular con-
demnation. For that course-the true course of judicial
duty always-will powerfully help to bring the people and
their representatives to a sense of their own responsibility."' 86
H. Allen Black
286. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting J. THAYER, O.W HOLMES,
& F FRANKFURTER, JOHN MARSHALL 88 (Phoemx ed. 1967)).
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